Struggle for Taiwan: Why Saving Taiwan is Worth It

Recently, I picked up Sulmaan Wasif Khan's The Struggle for Taiwan, motivated by my limited understanding of the ongoing situation between Taiwan and mainland China. After thoroughly enjoying it, I followed up with Chris Miller's Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. While both books were excellent, they had vastly different focuses. Chip War read much like a thriller, but I'll start by gathering my thoughts on Khan's work.

Khan's book offers a summary of events, providing a short overview of the complex relationship between Taiwan and mainland China. Here's an outline of the key points that stuck with me and made the book useful to me, either because they expanded my understanding or reinforced ideas I was already familiar with.

— Before 1683, Taiwan had never been part of anything that could be considered China. From 1683 onwards (up until becoming a Japanese colony), it was a part of the Qing Empire. The general idea is that Taiwan wasn't "part of China" for a long and uninterrupted period of time, and even when it was, it wasn't really China. However, I don't see this as particularly convincing as I'm under the impression that Qing Empire is thought to be synonymous to China by the Chinese.

— The Kuomintang (KMT), throughout its long history in Taiwan, hasn't been viewed positively by a large portion of the population. When they first arrived, the incoming army and political elite were often seen as brutal opportunists, exploiting Taiwan to support the failing and corrupt Republic of China in its battle against the increasingly powerful CCP on the mainland.

— Shortly after the KMT's arrival, anti-government protests ended up being violently stifled in the 228 Incident.

— The following decades were marked by brutal authoritarian rule, with Taiwan experiencing little of the democracy or progressivism that is now taken for granted on the island. Any dissent was met with force under Chiang Kai-shek and later his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, during a period known as the White Terror. Due to this brutality, the Japanese colonial era is often remembered more favorably, as it left Taiwan more developed and educated than its neighbors—likely because Japan intended to showcase Taiwan as an example colony.

— Chiang Kai-shek kept trying to draw the U.S. into a potential conflict with mainland China, never quite abandoning the idea of "retaking" the mainland. This kept Taiwan's political system stuck in the past, rather than focusing on its own development.

— Chiang Ching-kuo, who initially seemed similar to his father, eventually took a more positive turn by ending martial law, which concluded the White Terror and paved the way for democracy in Taiwan.

— Contrary to what one might expect, Taiwan's relationship with the U.S. hasn't always been as strong as it is now. In the past, the U.S. was often frustrated with Taiwan's leadership, who used American support to suppress human rights and escalate tensions with China.

— Khan suggests that the current state of affairs—where the CCP cannot conceive of a Taiwan separate from China—was not inevitable. It is largely the result of smaller historical events that could have gone either way, particularly Mao Zedong's decisions on how to handle Chiang Kai-shek. In the 1940s and 50s, the outcome could have been very different. The current notion of Taiwan as indivisible from the mainland is, in a sense, "manufactured." Taiwan could have easily become fully independent, or conversely, integrated into China long ago if, for example, the U.S. hadn't intervened in Korea in the 1950s.

— It was only after the introduction of democracy that political movements advocating for Taiwanese independence from China were officially recognized. This shift also made the KMT to reorient its approach, aligning more closely with public sentiment regarding Taiwan's status. For example, in the 1990s, KMT leader Lee Teng-hui supported Taiwanese independence.

— As democracy took hold and business connections between Taiwan and China grew, the prospect of war diminished, and mainland China largely refrained from any rash responses. During this period, China's leaders, such as Hu Jintao, were also less hostile and aggressive.

— A significant change occurred with Xi Jinping's rise to power as General Secretary of CCP. Khan argues that Xi Jinping failed to make the idea of Taiwan joining a unified China appealing. Case in point, the situation in Hong Kong—had Hong Kong been reintegrated more smoothly, or without attempts to hasten the process before the 50-year mark, Taiwan might view the situation differently today, and its political landscape might be focused on different issues.

From the book:

China had pursued a course that had alienated Taiwan completely. It had bullied, threatened, and displayed force, both at home and abroad. In doing so, it had made the thought of unification unacceptable to much of the Taiwanese electorate. It had sought to influence the democratic process there through meetings with KMT chieftains. In so doing, China had damaged the KMT's electoral prospects, perhaps irreparably.

— In Taiwan's political landscape, the KMT is generally seen as a more pro-mainland China party, despite its 1990s shift under Lee Teng-hui towards a more independence-oriented agenda.

— The U.S. remains unclear in its objectives regarding the Taiwan issue. While it's easy to see current U.S. support for Taiwan as a way to stick it to mainland China, there have been times when the U.S.'s benefits from supporting Taiwan (or its leaders) were less evident. Small differences in U.S. policy decisions at critical moments could have led to vastly different outcomes across the Taiwan Strait.

— China's increasingly aggressive behavior, not just towards Taiwan but towards many neighboring nations, is causing it to alienate the region. As countries react to China's actions, they are moving away from viewing China as a friendly power. Examples include China's "Wolf Warrior" diplomacy, its antagonism towards Taiwan through the WHO, its belligerence towards neighboring countries, and its nuclear buildup. Others see that too, hence there are reactions to China. China's also probably taken note of what's happening as it has toned down its Wolf Warrior diplomacy in the last year or so.

— Taiwan now has a thriving democracy, that has built itself up on its own, matured from its early days where it was ruled by force. It has learned from its past mistakes, has embraced freedom of speech, has a highly developed economy that's interconnected with global supply chains. Additionally, it actively works to uncover and confront the horrors under its dictatorial era.

My general thought is that if a people have a functioning democracy and desire independence, neither treaties nor agreements made by third parties (e.g. China and/or the U.S.) should stand in their way. I also believe that, even if supporting Taiwan benefits one imperial power, the primary focus should be on what the net result is, that is, whether it's in support of what the people of Taiwan want. This shouldn’t be dismissed as simply advancing "Western interests" if it is indeed something shown through voting. Their choice should be free and democratic, not made under coercion or the threat of force, including blockades. And that is the crux of the matter, China doesn't appear to care one bit whether Taiwanese population wants to be part of China or not.